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The Curious Case of Trent Arsenault: Questioning
FDA Regulatory Authority Over Private Sperm
Donation
Amber D. Abbasi*
Federal government regulation of reproductive medicine is fraught with
controversy. In many cases, federal and state laws clash over limiting the
extent of an individual's procreative freedom in pursuit of allegedly
compelling government interests.' Most of these hotly contested
2
regulations target provision of contraception and abortion services. In
relatively few instances has the government prevented two individuals from
conceiving a child in the manner they desire.3
Recent action by the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) created an
unusual legal situation. In November of 2010, the FDA's Center for
Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) issued an "Order to Cease
Manufacture" to Trent Arsenault, a Fremont, California man who has
fathered over a dozen children via artificial insemination (AI). Since 2006,
Mr. Arsenault offered semen donations4 to women (typically partnered
* Chief Counsel for Regulatory Affairs, Cause of Action. J.D., Harvard Law School, 2005.
The author would like to thank Trent Arsenault, on behalf of whom Cause of Action filed a
brief with the FDA discussing these issues; Michael Pepson, for his comments and
professional support; and her husband, Jaffer.
1. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Steve Eder, Appeals Court
Blocks Arizona Abortion Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10000872396390443545504577563561817792018.html; Nathan Koppel, Appellate
Ruling Upholds Texas Abortion Law, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052970204124204577152992567818170.html; Sabrina Tavernise &
Erik Eckholm, Ultrasound Abortion Bill Nears Vote in Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2012,
at A10; Campbell Robertson, Judge Maintains Injunction Against Mississippi Law on
Abortion Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2012, at A14.
2. See supra note 1.
3. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (concluding that society can and must prevent
the "feeble-minded" from reproducing through sterilization, effectively endorsing state-
sponsored negative eugenics), Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("The power to
sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or
reckless hands it can cause races or types, which are inimical to the dominant group to
wither and disappear. There is no redemption for the individual whom the law touches.").
4. Although the term "semen donation" is technically accurate here, "sperm donation" is
commonly used to describe that activity and the terms are used interchangeably throughout.
1
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lesbians) on a purely private, uncompensated basis. Typically, the federal
government permits women to vet potential fathers without interference,
but in this case the FDA announced that a man who provides cups of his
fresh semen to women, with the understanding that the artificial
insemination will be performed at home, not by a medical professional,
must comply with the plethora of regulations applicable to sperm banks and
small medical offices that practice reproductive medicine.
The regulation of assisted reproductive technologies (ART) has long
been the focus of legal academic study,6 and the potential for government
regulation of gamete donation and donor eligibility to have discriminatory
effects, or even to trend toward eugenics, illustrates the necessity of
weighing the alleged safety benefits of each such regulation against the
burdens imposed on individual rights. In previous instances, these articles
have analyzed ART regulation as applied to the fertility clinics, medical
practices, and semen banks through which infertile patients typically access
reproductive assistance.9 The regulation of these commercial enterprises, of
course, has indirect effects on individuals' ability to conceive. 10 But
because persons conceiving without the assistance of medical personnel or
5. See Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Order to Cease Manufacturing of
HCT/Ps-Trent C. Arsenault, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 1, 2010),
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/SafetyAvailability/TissueSafety/ucm232852.ht
m (last visited July 26, 2012) [hereinafter "Order"] (Ordering Mr. Arsenault to cease
dispensation of his sperm to committed couples on an uncompensated basis or risk criminal
and financial penalty).
6. E.g., Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, The Ever-Widening Gap Between the
Science of Artificial Reproductive Technology and the Laws Which Govern That Technology,
48 DEPAUL L. REv. 825 (1999); Helen M. Alvare, The Case for Regulating Collaborative
Reproduction: A Children's Rights Perspective, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2003); Lyria
Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technological Change: The Example of
In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 505 (2005).
7. See Luke A. Boso, The Unjust Exclusion of Gay Sperm Donors: Litigation Strategies
to End Discrimination in the Gene Pool, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 843, 844 (2008) (discussing the
FDA's explicitly discriminatory donor screening guidance document, which, inter alia,
excludes semen donors who have engaged in sex with other men at any time within the
preceding five years).
8. See Kerry Macintosh, Brave New Eugenics: Regulating Assisted Reproductive
Technologies in the Name of Better Babies, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 257 (2010).
Macintosh notes that not only is infertility itself a disability but that higher rates of health
problems among children conceived via ART may be a function of the parents' health status;
see id. at 296-98. Insofar as increased regulation of ART usage is intended to decrease the
number of such births, it functions as a eugenicist bar on reproduction by unhealthy or
genetically distinct populations. Cf. Mary Crossley, Dimensions of Equality in Regulating
Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 273, 285 (2005) (discussing
trait selection by users of ART and donated gametes).
9. See, e.g., supra note 6.
10. The regulation limits a prospective mother's choice of donors and increases her
conception costs.
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institutions have, historically, been permitted to do so without direct
regulation by the government," such exercises of State power have gone
relatively unaddressed by scholars.
The FDA's issuance of a cease-manufacture order to a private individual
semen donor presents a unique opportunity for logical extension of the
substantive due process doctrines developed by the courts throughout recent
decades, which typically addressed sexual and reproductive freedom
through a different lens. In many such instances, the challenged law
functioned to encourage procreation: bans on contraception,12 bans and
regulatory burdens on abortion,13 and criminalization of homosexuality. 14
Conversely, an FDA prohibition on private, uncompensated semen donation
prevents the affirmative exercise of procreative liberty.15
Even as Mr. Arsenault is in the focus of administrative proceedings that
challenge the application of these regulations to his particular
circumstances,1 6 the FDA's announced position affects other private
individual sperm donors and women to whom they donate. This article
examines the regulations that the FDA seeks to enforce against private
11. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (noting that the governmental power to ban contraceptives without compelling
state interest would implicate the state's ability to circumvent a couple's desire to reproduce,
the constitutionality of which he characterized as "silly").
12. E.g., Id.; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
13. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 121 (1973); accord Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 840 (1992); accord Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,
917 (2000); accord Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 134 (2007).
14. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003); accord Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986).
15. See generally Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 681 (1977) ("The
decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of . .. [a] cluster of
constitutionally protected choices ... [and] holds a particularly important place in the history
of the right of privacyFalse"); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54
(1973) (The right to privacy "encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the home,
the family, ... motherhood, [and] procreationFalse" (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted)); see generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
843 (1992) (Concluding that "personal decisions relating to ... procreation" are among "the
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, [that] are central to the liberty protected by the"
Constitution); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey at 926-27 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("Throughout this
century, this Court ... has held that the fundamental right of privacy protects citizens against
governmental intrusion in such intimate family matters as procreationFalse").
16. See Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Order to Cease Manufacturing of
HCT/Ps-Trent C. Arsenault, U.S. FuOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 1, 2010), http://
www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/SafetyAvailability/TissueSafety/ucm232852.htm
(last visited July 26, 2012) [hereinafter "Order"] (ordering Mr. Arsenault to cease
dispensation of his sperm to committed couples on an uncompensated basis or risk criminal
and financial penalty).
3
Abbasi: The Curious Case of Trent Arsenault: Questioning FDA Regulatory A
Published by LAW eCommons, 2013
Vol 22, 2013 Annals of Health Law 4
THE CURIOUS CASE OF TRENT ARSENAULT
sperm donors, their application in the Arsenault case, and the implications
of expanding the government's regulatory authority over individuals'
procreative decisions. Part I describes the phenomenon of private sperm
donation and how it fits into the landscape of reproductive medicine. Part
II discusses federal statutes and regulations that have historically been
enforced against medical establishments involved with sperm donation.
Part III discusses the Arsenault case and the FDA's unprecedented decision
to enforce these regulations against a private sperm donor. Part IV
examines whether the regulations and their enabling statute, in fact, cover
private sperm donor activity. Part V analyzes the possible consequences of
expanded federal regulatory authority over private, individual-to-individual
donations of sperm for artificial insemination.
I. SPERM DONATION: AN UNWLUSTRATED PRIMER
For many modern couples that want to start a family, tried and true
methods are inadequate. Heterosexual couples increasingly face fertility
challenges. But for couples or individuals without a male partner, the
obstacle is a lack of a father's genetic contribution, and this requires the
assistance of a third party. Perhaps the most established nontraditional
route is through sperm banks. These firms, regulated by federal law and
staffed by licensed medical professionals,1 often pay men for donations and
then sell the semen to women trying to conceive. Sperm-bank donors'
disclosure of information and degree of willingness for future contact with
the mother or child varies, but most donors are anonymous, providing data
only on medical history and physical traits, and donate on the condition of
limited potential for personal contact with resulting offspring." Donors are
assessed for infectious disease risk, personal and family health history,
sperm count, motility, and resilience to freezing, and are subjected to a
physical exam and blood and urine tests for infectious and hereditary
diseases.' 9 A preservative is added immediately to fresh sperm donations
by laboratory personnel, 20 and the sample is then frozen and subjected to six
21
months of quarantine.
Customers of sperm banks enter a medicalized and depersonalized space
where they exchange cash for the genetic material necessary to create life
17. 21 C.F.R § 1271.1 (2012); 21 C.F.R § 1271.170 (2012).
18. LOUISE SLOAN, KNOCK YOURSELF UP: No MAN? No PROBLEM! : A TELL-ALL GUIDE
TO BECOMING A SINGLE MOM (2007).
19. 21 C.F.R § 1271.50 (2005); 21 C.F.R. § 1271.75 (2005); 21 C.F.R. § 1271.80
(2005); 21 C.F.R. § 1271.85 (2005).
20. SLOAN, supra note 18, at 67.
21. 21 C.F.R § 1271.60 (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 1271.85(d) (2012). Indeed, the six-month
quarantine period is mandated by the FDA's regulations governing HCT/P's.
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and have no personal connection to the potential biological father. Vials of
frozen semen can be purchased and drop-shipped directly to the recipient's
doorstep; the bank staff requires no in-person consultation.22 The most
common form of Al, intracervical insemination, closely replicates natural
insemination: fresh semen can simply be placed in the woman's vagina
using nothing more than a needleless syringe; the procedure can be
conducted from the comfort of home without medical personnel
23
assistance.
Additionally, significant disadvantages are associated with use of sperm
banks. As mentioned above, sperm from banks often come with minimum
information about donors and allows for little chance for the woman or
child to have contact with them. Would-be purchasers usually go through
at least one medical gatekeeper, such as their personal physician.24 The
chemicals added to protect sperm from damage in freezing can cause
25
external and internal reactions in some women. For women who use
intracervical insemination, frozen sperm are less likely than fresh to lead to
a pregnancy.26 Costs can also mount quickly: each vial contains only 1
22. Artificial Inseminations, CRYOS INTERNATIONAL, NEW YORK, http://
ny.cryosintemational.com/private-customers/getting-started/artificial-inseminations.aspx
(last visited Aug. 2, 2012); E.g., Instruction Page for Registration in Frozen Donor
Program, RAINBOW FLAG HEALTH SERVICES, http://www.gayspermbank.com/
program.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2012).
23. SLOAN, supra note 18, at 65-91. For women who require more than this to conceive,
medical help is necessary. For example, a clinician may perform other insemination
methods that place the sperm in closer proximity to the ovum, such as intrauterine,
intratubal, or intrauterine-tuboperitoneal insemination. However, fresh semen cannot be
used in these procedures, as the sperm must be washed to remove prostaglandin-bearing
seminal fluids that cause uterine cramping.
24. Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted
Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 147, 148 & 152 (2000) (In some states, the gatekeeper is a mandatory role.
Five ... states have statutory language criminalizing artificial insemination if a
licensed physician does not perform it. For example, Georgia's statute provides,
in relevant part: "Physicians and surgeons licensed to practice medicine. . shall
be the only persons authorized to administer or perform artificial insemination...
Any other person or persons... shall be guilty of a felonyFalse" This creates a
real barrier for gays and lesbians, as well as heterosexuals, wishing to utilize
artificial insemination. Many prefer to self-inseminate in the privacy of their own
home, thus avoiding medical professionals with perceived or real discriminatory
practices. Requiring the involvement of a physician may also create a financial
barrier to those who cannot afford the additional medical costs.).
See generally Recipient Information for Ordering and Use of Donor Specimens, PACIFIC
REPRODUCTIVE SERVICES, https://pacrepro.com/documents/how.pdf (outlining an example of
the procedures).
25. Artificial Insemination Information, NW CRYOBANK, https://www.nwcryobank.
com/artificial-insemination (last visited June 13, 2012).
26. LL Subak, GD Adamson, NL Boltz, Therapeutic Donor Insemination: A Prospective
5
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milliliter (mL) of semen (versus the average ejaculatory output in natural
insemination of 2-4 mL), costs hundreds of dollars, and many women use
27
more than one vial per attempt.
Women who are discouraged by the bank's conditions or priced out of
the frozen-semen market may seek out a more unconventional, old-
fashioned path: to conceive a child using genetic material from a private
individual, unmediated by doctors, sperm banks, or anonymity
requirements. 28 Although in decades past a woman seeking impregnation
without legal ties might have little choice but to roll the dice through sexual
contact with strangers, the immense power of connectivity created by the
Internet has allowed otherwise isolated individuals to find each other:
women seeking a non-standard sperm donor and men willing to provide
sperm on the woman's terms.29
Private sperm donation is not a new phenomenon, but it is a growing
one. Donors may advertise their availability on a centralized forum, such as
FreeSpermDonorRegistry.com, or on other Internet venues such as Yahoo
or Google Groups.30 Still others have individual websites collecting a wide
range of frequently requested information.3 Because the donors provide
the information, a certain amount of trust is involved. Many women are
comfortable with the prospect of assessing the honesty of men seeking to
impregnate them.
The contrast between the meticulously mediated sperm-bank experience
and the direct donor/donee interaction available with private donors is
remarkable. Women can initiate contact with donors, talk with donors,
even meet them. Women can also seek out donors who have certain
physical or personality traits and question them personally. And because
private donors are more diverse than bank donors and vary as to the scope
of services they provide, a wider set of preferences can be catered to.
While sperm banks enforce sameness, the possibilities with private
donation are theoretically limitless. Many sperm banks only accept
donations from men in a certain age range, and some favor donations from
taller or slimmer men, but (as we see in many families) not all women
Randomized Trial of Fresh Versus Frozen Pperm. NATIONAL CENTER FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY
INFORMATION, available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/1615966.
27. SEATTLE SPERM BANK, Information for Directed Donors and their Recipients,
http://www.seattlespermbank.com/directed donors.asp (last visited June 13, 2012); see
generally DeLair, supra note 24, at 160-61 (discussing economic barriers to use of ART).
28. Tony Dokoupil, You Got Your Sperm Where?, THE DAILY BEAST (Oct. 2, 2011),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/10/02/free-sperm-donors-and-the-women-
who-want-them.html.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g.,TRENTDONOR, http://www.trentdonor.org (last visited June 13, 2012).
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prioritize youth, height, or svelteness in determining the suitability of a
potential father. Private donors may make different commitments to
present and future information disclosures and contact than do donors at
banks, providing recipients with more information about their continuing
lifestyle and health and more flexible terms for disclosing donor identity to
offspring.
Selecting a private sperm donor is, by its very nature, a personal and
individualized decision. Just as in choosing a conventional sexual partner,
the woman can exercise as much or as little care as she desires-some
donors are asked for and provide questionnaires, interviews, reference
checks, and requests for medical test results.32  Screening for sexually
transmitted infections (STIs) and other health problems, including genetic
disorders, may occur if the donor-recipient agreement calls for it, but the
accuracy of the results must be taken at face value, without the added layer
of objectivity that testing by a bank could provide. After donor and
recipient reach an accord, they may formalize the arrangement by signing
contracts that outline their understanding and seek to limit the legal
responsibilities of the donor.33 All that remains is the actual process of
insemination.
Some private donors provide natural insemination services. Natural
insemination involves sexual intercourse between the donor and recipient.
This form of sperm donation is distinguishable from conventional sexual
relationships only by the intentions of the parties and involves significant
disease risk to both. Obviously, barrier methods cannot be used; diseases
can be spread not just via male-to-female transmission of bodily fluids, but
female-to-male, as well as via skin-to-skin contact between the donor and
recipient. Additionally, disease risk is present if the donor or recipient is
sexually active. Although ideally the donor and recipient (like any pair
engaging in unprotected sex) would provide current STI and other medical
test results to ensure that neither party is exposed to contagion, the risks of a
sexual encounter are unavoidably greater with natural insemination than
with artificial insemination.
As practiced by private donors, though, artificial insemination is not risk
free. Fluid-based infections could still be transmitted to the recipient.
Nevertheless, these risks are much less than those of natural insemination,
32. Dokoupil, supra note 28.
33. A married or partnered recipient may have to take additional legal action to ensure
that her spouse or partner is a registered second parent on the birth certificate of any
offspring. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (Deering 2012). Although state laws vary, many states
do not treat private sperm donors similarly to donors to sperm banks. For example,
California only limits legal and financial liability for sperm donors whose gametes were
channeled through a bank or other medical physician or surgeon.
7
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and even lower than those presented by singles-bar hookups or no-strings-
attached casual encounters in which many engage. Absent access to sperm
banks or private donors, women seeking impregnation outside a
34
relationship may turn toward such options. However, when offered a
choice, many take advantage of willing donors to create new lives on their
own terms.
If a recipient elects to use privately donated sperm for artificial
insemination, she can perform the insemination (using the intracervical
method) at a clinic, at home, or even in her car.3 5 She can coordinate these
donations with her ovulation cycle to maximize the chance of fresh sperm
encountering a released ovum. And, like women who conceive via
intercourse with a partner, she needs not work with or through a medical
professional, whose services may not be covered by insurance36 and who
may act as a gatekeeper, discouraging single women and lesbians from
34. See Katheryn D. Katz, The Clonal Child: Procreative Liberty and Asexual
Reproduction, 8 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 1, 33-34 (1997) (discussing single or lesbian
women's diminished access to ART due to the historically entrenched gatekeeper role of
physicians and the resulting use of private donors in private settings).
35. Joanna L. Grossman, Men Who Give It Away: The Potential Perils of Free and Non-
Anonymous Sperm Donation, VERDICT JUSTIA (Jan. 24, 2012), http://
verdictjustia.com/2012/01/24/men-who-give-it-away (last visited Aug. 3, 2012).
36. Michelle Andrews, Health Insurance Rules May Decide Whether Infertility
Treatment is Essential, WASH. POST, (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/01/24/AR2011012405363.html (last accessed Jun. 13, 2012). "Even
if a plan covers IVF, it may cover only a certain number of cycles, or attempts, or cap the
dollar amount it will pay for services." Of note also is the plethora of state laws regulating
the provision of insurance coverage for infertility treatment. NAT'L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATION, State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/insurance-coverage-for-infertility-laws.aspx (last
accessed June 13, 2012). However, it is uncertain whether lesbian couples, like those to
whom Arsenault donates, can reap the benefits of these laws:
[M]ost insurance companies and all nine states, provide benefits for assisted
reproductive technology, only for "medically necessary" treatments related to the
diagnosis of "infertility." For example, Connecticut's statute requires insurance
companies to offer insurance providing "medically necessary expenses for the
diagnosis or treatment of infertility." Infertility is defined as the inability to
conceive after one year of intercourse without contraception. Treatment that is
medically necessary is typically defined as treatments that require a physician's
order, are recognized as the appropriate treatment for the illness, and are not
experimental in nature. By definition, gays and lesbians are not medically
infertile, rather, they are constructively infertile because they do not have sexual
intercourse with members of the opposite sex. Therefore, assisted reproductive
technologies would not be considered medically necessary for a homosexual who
could "technically" reproduce by lesser intrusive means. Thus, it is unlikely that
the inability to procreate secondary to homosexuality will be recognized as an
illness requiring "appropriate treatment."
DeLair, supra note 24, at 175-76.
8
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obtaining fertility care.3 7 The private nature of the relationship between
donor and recipient provides a unique option to women seeking to conceive
and does not function as a perfect substitute for sperm bank donations.
II. THE REGULATED STATUS QUO OF SPERM BANK DONATION
Private sperm donation, with its close correspondence to familiar models
of mate selection, contrasts dramatically with the sperm bank industry.
Sperm banks are subject to federal (and, often, state)38 regulations that
attempt to ensure safety of users of these businesses. However, the
complexity of the federal regulatory scheme alone creates compliance
burdens that are significant for a profit-oriented medical enterprise and
practically impossible for an individual.
First, a sperm bank is subject to a panoply of regulations promulgated
pursuant to Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA).3 9 These
regulations are intended to set up a "unified registration and listing system
for establishments that manufacture human cells, tissues, and cellular and
tissue-based products (HCT/P's) and to establish donor-eligibility, current
37. Mary Crossley, Dimensions of Equality in Regulating Assisted Reproductive
Technologies, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 273 (2005) (discussing discriminatory provision of
access to ART); see also Interview by David Masci with Ira "Chip" Lupu, F. Elwood and
Eleanor Davis Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School, & Robert
W. Tuttle, David R. and Sherry Kirschner Berz Research Professor of Law and Religion,
The George Washington University Law School (June 3, 2010), http://
www.pewforum.org/Church-State-Law/Tensions-Between-Rights-of-Conscience-and-Civil-
Rights.aspx; N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 4th 1145
(2008) (Although the Supreme Court of California held that physicians' free exercise rights
did not allow them to decline to serve a lesbian couple seeking fertility treatment, it is
unclear whether such a result would also be reached in other jurisdictions, given the role of
State law antidiscrimination protections in that case and recent developments in federal First
Amendment jurisprudence.).
38. See, e.g, CRYOGAM COLORADO, http://www.cryogam.com/CG-Licensure.html (last
visited Sept. 28, 2012); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw §§ 573, 575 (Mckinney 1993); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1639.1 (West 1991); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH Occ. § 17.301
(West 2012). New York, California, and Maryland require licensure of sperm banks.
39. See Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and
Tissue-Based Products, 69 Fed. Reg. 29, 786-7, 29 (May 25, 2004) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§
210-1, 820, 1271 (2012)):
We are issuing these new regulations under the authority of section 361 of the
Public Health Services (PHS) Act, 42 U.S.C. 264 (2012). Under that section, by
delegation from the Surgeon General and the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, the FDA may make and enforce regulations necessary to prevent the
introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases between the
States or from foreign countries into the States. Intrastate transactions affecting
communicable disease transmission may also be regulated under section 361 of
the PHS Act.
See also Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682, 703, § 361 (1944)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2012)).
9
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good tissue practice, and other procedures to prevent the introduction,
transmission, and spread of communicable diseases by HCT/Ps.."40
Although additional regulations apply to institutions trafficking in HCT/P's
that are, due to extensive manipulation or the addition of adulterating
agents, considered "drugs, devices or biological products," 4 1 sperm banks
must comply with those regulations set out in 21 C.F.R. Part 1271, Subparts
A, B, C, and F, and a portion of Subpart D.42  The requirements apply
"whether or not the HCT/P enters into interstate commerce." 4 3 Violation of
the FDA's HCT/P regulations is a strict-liability federal crime that is
punishable by imprisonment for up to one year and a substantial fine. 44
The FDA's role in ensuring compliance with these regulations is of
comparatively recent vintage. Although other human cells and tissues were
regulated under C.F.R. Part 1270 since 1993,45 the regulations in Part 1271
40. 21 C.F.R § 1271.1(a) (2012). 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d) defines HCT/P's as "articles
containing or consisting of human cells or tissues that are intended for implantation,
transplantation, infusion, or transfer into a human recipient. Examples of HCT/P's include,
but are not limited to . . . semen or other reproductive tissue."
41. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2010). E.g. "[B]lood, blood component[s] or derivative[s] ...
applicable to the prevention, treatment or cure of a disease or condition of human beings."
42. 21 C.F.R § 1271.10 (2012); see also U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., Guidance for
Industry Regulation of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products
(HCT/Ps) - Small Entity Compliance Guide, at 5, http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances
/Tissue/ucm062592.pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2012). "Subparts A through C apply to all 361
HCT/Ps. Subpart D applies only to nonreproductive 361 HCT/Ps, with the exception of 21
C.F.R 1271.150(c) and 1271.155, which apply to all 361 HCT/Ps. Subpart E applies only to
nonreproductive 361 HCT/Ps. Subpart F applies to all 361 HCT/P's."
43. 21 C.F.R § 1271.1(b) (2012).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). "Penalties for persons violating quarantine laws. Any
person who violates any regulation prescribed under sections 361, 362, or 363 [42 U.S.C.S.
§§ 264, 265, or 266], or any provision of section 366 [42 U.S.C.S. § 269] or any regulation
prescribed thereunder, or who enters or departs from the limits of any quarantine station,
ground, or anchorage in disregard of quarantine rules and regulations or without permission
of the quarantine officer in charge, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both."; see also Current Good Tissue Practice
for Human Cell, Tissue, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Product Establishments; Inspection
and Enforcement, 69 Fed. Reg. 68, 612, 68, 614 (Nov. 24, 2004) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts.
16, 1270, 1271). "[U]nder section 368(a) of the PHS Act (42 U.S.C. 271), any person who
violates a regulation prescribed under section 361 of the PHS Act may be punished by
imprisonment for up to 1 year. Individuals may also be punished for violating such a
regulation by a fine of up to $100,000 if death has not resulted from the violation or up to
$250,000 if death has resulted." The FDA's decision to interpret its regulations to
criminalize certain private procreative decisions stands in tension with a long line of
Supreme Court cases striking down state statutes that criminalized private procreation-
related choices; see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (1975); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
45. U. S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SCREENING AND TESTING OF
DONORS OF HUMAN TISSUE INTENDED FOR TRANSPLANTATION 2 (July 1997),
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applicable to reproductive tissues are less than a decade old:46 registration
and listing requirements were established in 2001,4 and the subparts
specifying donor-eligibility requirements and current good tissue practice,
inspection, and enforcement were not created until 2004.48 However, the
short history of these regulations is in sharp contrast to their requirements.
A Registration
A sperm bank must first register and list its HCT/P's with the FDA's
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research. 49 This registration, which
must be sent within five days of beginning operations and updated every
December,5 0 must include the establishment's name, location, the name,
address, title of the reporting official, and a list of all HCT/P's that the
establishment recovers, processes, stores, labels, packages, distributes, or
upon which it performs donor screening or testing.i These registrations are
then available for public inspection.
B. Determining and Recording Donor Eligibility
Sperm banks must conduct donor-eligibility determinations, which
require donor screening and testing for relevant communicable disease
agents and diseases.53 Donated semen must not be transferred to a recipient
until after the donor-eligibility determination is complete54 and must be
quarantined in the interim. The determinations must be conducted
according to established procedures that have been defined, documented,
reviewed by a responsible party prior to implementation, and revised as
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnf
ormation/Guidances/Tissue/UCM188251.pdf.
46. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY REGULATION OF HUMAN
CELLS, TISSUES, AND CELLULAR AND TISSUE-BASED PRODUCTS (HCT/Ps) - SMALL ENTITY
COMPLIANCE GUIDE (Aug. 2007), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/
GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/Tissue/ucm062592.pdf.
47. Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Establishment
Registration and Listing, 69 Fed. Reg. 3823-24 (Jan. 27, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §
1271).
48. Current Good Tissue Practice for Human Cell, Tissue and Cellular and Tissue-Based
Product Establishments; Inspection and Enforcement, 69 Fed. Reg. 68612 (November 24,
2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § § 1270-71).
49. Id.
50. 21 C.F.R § 1271.21 (2012).
51. 21 C.F.R § 1271.25 (2012).
52. 21 C.F.R § 1271.37 (2012).
53. 21 C.F.R § 1271.45(b) (2012). A limited exception exists for donations from
sexually intimate partners of the recipient, as will be discussed at length infra.
54. 21 C.F.R § 1271.45(c) (2012).
55. 21 C.F.R § 1271.60(a) (2012).
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56
necessary in response to continuing review.
The determination procedure includes both screening and testing
components. Donor screening establishes that the donor "[i]s free from risk
factors for, and clinical evidence of, infection due to relevant communicable
disease agents and diseases [and] communicable disease risks associated
with xenotransplantation"; donor testing confirms that the donor is not
positive for "relevant communicable disease agents."
The donor must provide available laboratory test results and other
records, medical or otherwise, which pertain to risk factors for relevant
communicable disease agents or diseases (RCDADs).ss This process also
requires a "current donor medical history interview" (conducted in person
or by telephone, and verifies answers to any self-administered medical
questionnaire) 59 and physical examination of the donor.60 The "current
medical history interview" is not, strictly speaking, "medical"; rather, it is a
"documented dialog about," among other things, the donor's "relevant
social behavior." 61
Although it can affect whether a prospective donor is eligible to help a
woman start a family, FDA regulations do not specify what constitutes a
"relevant social behavior."62 21 C.F.R. Part 1271.3's definition of"[d]onor
medical history interview" indicates "relevant social behavior" includes, but
56. 21 C.F.R § 1271.47 (2012).
57. 21 C.F.R § 1271.50 (2012).
58. Id. This includes "[r]ecords or other information received from any source pertaining
to risk factors for relevant communicable disease (e.g. social behavior, clinical signs and
symptoms of relevant communicable disease, and treatments related to medical conditions
suggestive of risk for relevant communicable disease)." For repeat donors, a bank may
perform an abbreviated screening if it has been six months or less since he completed a full
screening. An abbreviated screening requires only review and documentation of "any
changes in the donor's medical history since the previous donation that would make the
donor ineligible, including relevant social behavior." 21 C.F.R § 1271.75(e) (2012).
59. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.75(a)(1) (stating "if you are the establishment that performs
donor screening, you must screen a donor of cells or tissue by reviewing the donor's relevant
medical records for . . . [r]isk factors for, and clinical evidence of, relevant communicable
disease agents and diseasesFalse" (emphasis added)); see 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(s) ("Relevant
medical records means a collection of documents that includes a current donor medical
history interviewFalse" (emphasis added)).
60. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.75; Guidance for Industry: Eligible Determination for Doctors of
Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceCompliance
Regulatorylnformation/Guidances/Tissue/ucm073964.htm#DONORSCREENING1271.75.
61. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(n) ("Donor medical history interview means a documented
dialog about the donor's medical history and relevant social behavior, including activities,
behaviors, and descriptions considered to increase the donor's relevant communicable
disease risk.").
62. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3 (How does FDA define important terms in this part?); 21
C.F.R. § 1271.75 (How do I screen a donor?).
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is not limited to, "activities, behaviors, and descriptions considered to
increase the donor's relevant communicable disease risk." 63
As the FDA acknowledged in the preamble to its final rule establishing
the requirement to screen for "relevant social behaviors," commenters on
the proposed rule "asserted that the regulations would abridge the
reproductive, civil, or constitutional rights of both donor and recipient" and
"[m]any comments argued that the proposed regulations were
discriminatory."64 In response to those comments, which urged the FDA to
limit screening to actual medical tests, instead of screening for "relevant
social behaviors" that are "risk factors," the FDA noted simply that the
"FDA rejects that approach at this time. "65 The FDA explained that specific
"risk factors" will be outlined in a subsequent guidance document. 66
As promised, the FDA fleshed out the requirement to screen for "risk
factors" in a 2007 guidance document, which indicated that the donor-
screening process requires exclusion of potential donors who manifest one
or more of a long list of "relevant" behaviors or characteristics.67 This list
encompasses not just intravenous drug users, prostitutes, and individuals
with hemophilia who have received human-blood-derived clotting
treatments, but also men who have engaged in homosexual sex and persons
who have had sex with any individual in the aforementioned categories.68
Additionally, the regulations bar donation by, inter alia, xenotransplantation
product recipients and their intimate contacts; 69 the recently tattooed;70
anyone who has had his ears or body pierced in the past year without
63. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(n).
64. Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and
Tissue-Based Products, Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 29, 786, 29, 805 (May 25, 2004) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 210-1, 820, 1271).
65. Id. at 29, 806.
66. Id. "[T]his final rule does not specify risk factors. Risk factors and other information
about screening are contained in the donor-eligibility draft guidance announced elsewhere in
this Federal Register."
67. Id. at 1; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ELIGIBILITY
DETERMINATION FOR DONORS OF HUMAN CELLS, TISSUES, AND CELLULAR AND TISSUE-BASED
PRODUCTS (HCT/Ps) pt. IV(E), at 14-20 (2007) [hereinafter ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE],
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/G
uidances/Tissue/ucm073964.htm (listing "potential donor[s]" that a covered entity "should
determine to be ineligible" because they "exhibit[] one or more ... conditions or behaviors"
(emphasis added)). The FDA claims that this guidance document merely prescribes
"nonbinding recommendations."
68. Id. pt. IV(E)(1)-(5), at 14-15 (excluding various categories of men from the donor
pool, the regulations effectively prevent some women from conceiving a child with the type
of man, or even specific man, of their choice).
69. Id. pt. IV(E)(29), at 20-21.
70. Id.. pt. IV(E)(10), at 16.
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observing FDA-approved protocol; 1 persons who have resided in the
United Kingdom, Europe, or specified African countries for certain
proscribed periods (and persons whose "sexual partners" were born in
certain African countries);72 U.S. military personnel and "civilian military
employees" and their dependents, if they resided at certain U.S. military
bases during the 1980s;73 persons who have shared a house or apartment
with someone who has certain forms of hepatitis within the past year;74
prospective donors who have been diagnosed with certain forms of mental
illness;7 and anyone who was detained in "juvenile detention, lock up, jail
or prison" for more than 72 hours in the past year (irrespective of the
person's guilt or innocence and regardless of whether he was charged with a
crime).76 The foregoing list of "relevant social behaviors" is illustrative, not
exhaustive. The FDA's proffered reason for recommending that anyone
who engaged in this type of "relevant [i.e., undesirable] social behavior"
from the donor pool is, of course, that the foregoing are "risk factors for
relevant communicable disease agents and diseases.
The FDA also has specific requirements to screen for communicable
diseases. Semen donor-eligibility determinations must include screening
and testing for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), types 1 and 2;
hepatitis B virus; hepatitis C virus; human transmissible spongiform
encephalopathy diseases, including Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (the human
form of "mad cow disease"); treponema pallidum, a spirochete that can
cause syphilis or other infectious diseases; types I and II of human T-
lymphotropic virus, a human RNA retrovirus that causes certain cancers;
cytomegalovirus; chlamydia trachomatis; and neisseria gonorrhea.
Additionally, the FDA has noted that certain other diseases pose sufficient
disease risk to justify screening including West Nile virus, sepsis, and
vaccinia (the virus used in smallpox vaccinations). Moreover, semen
banks must use FDA licensed, approved, or cleared donor screening tests
and be certified to perform such testing on human specimens either under
the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) or equivalent
requirements as determined by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
71. Id.
72. Id. pt. IV(E)(23), (25), (27), at 19.
73. Id. pt. IV(E)(24).
74. Id. pt. IV(E)(9), at 15.
75. Id. pt. IV(E)(20), at 18.
76. Id. pt. IV(E)(8), at 15.
77. Id. pt. IV(E), at 14.
78. 21 C.F.R § 1271.75(a)-(c) (2012).
79. ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, supra note 67, pt. III(D), at 5-7.
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Services.so
After a semen bank performs the testing and screening described above,
it must retain records and interpretation of the tests, the name and address
of the testing laboratory, and the resulting donor eligibility determination,
including the name of the responsible person who made the donor eligibility
determination, and the date of the determination. These records must be
maintained for least ten years.82 The donated semen itself must be kept in a
container labeled with a distinct identification code, the results of the donor
eligibility determination, and a summary of the records used to make the
determination.83 These records must also accompany the sample if it is
distributed or transported.8 4
Even donors who are initially deemed "eligible" to assist women who
want to conceive children via Al, can subsequently be excluded from the
donor pool based on changes in their "relevant social behavior." Indeed, 21
C.F.R. Part 1271.75(e), which allows for an "abbreviated donor screening
procedure on repeat donations," explicitly instructs "establishments that
perform[] donor screening" to "determine and document" any changes in
the repeat donor's "relevant social behavior" that could "make the donor
ineligibleFalse"ss
As one can see, sperm banks are subject to a comprehensive set of
regulatory obligations applicable to gamete donation. They must conduct
extensive reviews of donors' medical records and "relevant social
behaviors" and test donors for a wide variety of diseases within a week of
the donation itself using government-approved tests in labs meeting
government-approved standards. The expense of performing these
screening and testing procedures, as well as the cost of maintaining records
of the results for at least a decade, highlights the necessity of
professionalization, economies of scale, and perhaps most importantly,
monetary compensation for institutions performing these functions.
However, not every donation triggers the full slate of precautions.
C. Donations Exempt from Part 1271 's Requirements
Perhaps the most important exception to the Part 1271 requirements is
80. 21 C.F.R § 1271.80(c) (2012); ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, supra note 67, pt. V(2), at 25.
Where the establishment accepting the donation contracts with another entity to perform
testing, the establishment is responsible for ensuring that the testing facility complies with
current good tissue practice requirements. 21 C.F.R § 1271.150(c) (2012).
81. 21 C.F.R § 1271.55(d)(1) (2012).
82. 21 C.F.R § 1271.55(d)(4) (2012).
83. 21 C.F.R § 1271.55(a) (2012).
84. Id.
85. 21 C.F.R § 1271.75(e) (2012).
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the exception for donations that will be immediately transferred into a
sexually intimate partner (SIP) of the semen donor. An establishment that
"only recovers reproductive cells or tissue and immediately transfers them
into a sexually intimate partner of the cell or tissue donor" is not required to
register or list its HCT/Ps with CBER.8 6 Similarly, "[r]eproductive cells or
tissue donated by a sexually intimate partner of the recipient for
reproductive use" are exempt from Part 1271's requirements to screen, test,
and conduct donor eligibility determinations.8  Thus, many of the
burdensome and costly FDA regulations do not apply if a donation comes
from the recipient's sexually intimate partner, and the definition of that term
becomes vital to individuals who seek to give or receive donated semen in a
purely private, non-clinical context.
The FDA distinguishes sexually intimate partners from so-called
"directed donors." A directed reproductive donor is defined in 21 C.F.R.
Part 1271.3(1) as "a donor of reproductive cells or tissue (including semen,
oocytes, and embryos to which the donor contributed the spermatozoa or
oocyte) to a specific recipient, and who knows and is known by the
recipient before donation." Importantly, the term directed reproductive
donor "does not include a sexually intimate partner. "89 Under FDA
regulations, a donor eligibility determination is mandatory for directed
donations of reproductive tissue, as are screening and tests for disease. 90
Thus, if a donor is "known" but is not an SIP, the regulatory burden is much
greater, and the FDA imposes the aforementioned screening, testing,
labeling, and records requirements, most of which are impracticable for
private individuals to follow.
By implication, then, the FDA's HCT/P regulations distinguish between
sexually intimate heterosexual couples and others: heterosexual sexually
intimate couples need not adhere to the same regulatory strictures as
married women whose husbands happen to be infertile, single women,
86. 21 C.F.R § 1271.15(e) (2012).
87. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.90(a)(2) (2012).
88. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(I) (2012).
89. Id. See also 69 F.R. § 29,786, 29793. "We have also clarified the definition by
noting that directed reproductive donors do not include sexually intimate donors, who are
excepted from screening and testing requirements under § 1271.90. This change is intended
to make clear that, for the purpose of this rule, there are three categories of reproductive
donors, subject to three different sets of requirements listed as follows: (1) The anonymous
donor, to whom all the donor-eligibility requirements apply; (2) the directed reproductive
donor, whose reproductive cells and tissue may be used even if the donor is determined
ineligible; and (3) the sexually intimate partner, for whom testing and screening are not
required (discussed in section III.D.1 1 of this document)."
90. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.50 (2012); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VACCINES, BLOOD, AND
BIOLOGICs (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/guidance
complianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/tissue/ucm073964.
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women who are in same-sex relationships; and men who, for any reason,
wish to exercise their fundamental right to procreate outside of a sexually
intimate relationship. This suspect classification seems to not only suggest
an institutionalized bias against certain nontraditional methods of
conception but also reflects a normative judgment that more traditional
family structures-i.e., one in which a child is raised by his or her
biological parents-are somehow more valid than less conventional family
structures in which a biological parent is absent.
III. MAKING AN EXAMPLE: THE ARSENAULT CASE 91
The difficulty of applying these regulatory requirements to private
individuals outside the bounds of a medical facility is well illustrated by the
recent case of Trent Arsenault, the first-ever individual semen donor to be
issued a cease-manufacture order by the FDA. Although the conduct
Arsenault engaged in bears some resemblance to the conventional donation
process, the challenges of holding individuals to the same standards as
clinics raise serious questions as to the proper scope of regulating artificial
insemination.
Trent Arsenault is a computer-security professional who lives in the San
Francisco Bay Area. Since 2006, Arsenault has donated semen to women
wishing to conceive. What distinguishes Arsenault from most other donors
is that he does so without the involvement of a medical facility or semen
bank.92
Most of Arsenault's recipients find him through the Internet. Arsenault's
website, trentdonor.org, is an encyclopedic repository of information about
him and his donation activities. It includes photographs of Arsenault at a
wide range of ages, from infancy to the present. 93 He publicly posts his
physical appearance, including age, weight,94 an IQ test result,95 educational
history including areas of study and university attended, 96 field of
employment and earnings history,9 ethnic heritage,98 musical abilities,
91. The author, through her employer organization, provided pro bono legal services to
Mr. Arsenault and filed a brief on his behalf in support of his request for a hearing before the
FDA. See supra note *.
92. Benjamin Wallace, The Virgin Father, N. Y. MAGAZINE (Feb. 5, 2012), available at
http://nymag.com/news/features/trent-arsenault-2012-2/index3.html.
93. Trent Arsenault, Gallery, http://trentdonor.org/index.php?q=gallery (last visited June
13, 2012).
94. Trent Arsenault, Trent's Profile, http://trentdonor.org/trent (last visited June 13,
2012).
95. Trent Arsenault, Psychological and IQ, http://trentdonor.org/iq (last visited June 13,
2012).
96. Arsenault, supra note 94.
97. Trent Arsenault, About Trent - Background Check Information, http://trentdonor.org/
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hobbies, personality traits, 99 and even the results of his criminal background
check.U00 He includes a lengthy set of health records,ol including genetic
analysis and family medical history, 102 the results of regular tests for
communicable diseases,103 responses to the FDA-recommended screening
questions,104 and a description of his exercise and dietary regimen.Ios
Arsenault also is open about his abstinent lifestyle, which reduces his risk
of communicable disease.106 Arsenault currently donates only to couples,
including both male/female and female/female partnerships.
Arsenault details the history of his donation activities, with the ratio of
donations to successful pregnancies tracked. 107 The site explains that semen
donations themselves are packaged in sterile specimen cups and offered for
in-person pickup on a date selected by the recipient (shipping is not
available).os The semen is not frozen or quarantined, and Arsenault
provides links to studies suggesting a greater likelihood of pregnancy from
the use of fresh semen. 109
Arsenault posts a blank version of the donor agreement that he uses as
well.110 The agreement states that Arsenault disclaims any interest in
custody, visitation, or guardianship of resulting children and that the
recipient agrees to absolve Arsenault of financial liability. The terms
provide that any decision to inform a child of his or her biological origin
background (last visited June 13, 2012).
98. Trent Arsenault, Family History, Ancestry, http://trentdonor.org/family (last visited
June 13, 2012).
99. Arsenault, supra note 94.
100. Arsenault, supra note 97.
101. Trent Arsenault, Medical History, http://trentdonor.org/medical (last visited June
13, 2012).
102. Trent Arsenault, Genetics, Tay-Sachs, Cystic Fibrosis, Canavan Disease, 23andme,
DNA Analysis, Telomere Length, http://trentdonor.org/genetics (last visited June 13, 2012).
103. Trent Arsenault, Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STD) Tests Copies, http://
trentdonor.org/std (last visited June 13, 2012).
104. Trent Arsenault, Lifestyle Questionnaire, http://trentdonor.org/screening (last
visited June 13, 2012).
105. Trent Arsenault, Fertility Diet, Increase Sperm Count, Limit DNA Damage, Calorie
Restriction, and Telomere Length http://trentdonor.org/diet (last visited June 13, 2012).
106. Trent Arsenault, Abstinence and Sperm Donation, Sex, Health and Longevity,
http://trentdonor.org/abstinence (last visited June 13, 2012); Wallace, supra at note 92.
107. Trent Arsenault, Statistics Data, http://trentdonor.org/statistics (last visited June 13,
2012).
108. Trent Arsenault, Local Recipients, http://trentdonor.org/local (last accessed June
13, 2012); Arsenault formerly was willing to ship to recipients if they purchased a
professionally-created overnight shipping kit from Northwest Andrology and Cryobank.
109. Trent Arsenault, Fresh Raw Semen vs. Frozen (cryopreserved) Semen,
http://trentdonor.org/fresh (last visited June 13, 2012).
110. Trent Arsenault, Donor Agreement, http://trentdonor.org/contract (last visited June
13, 2012).
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rests entirely upon the recipient and that any contact or communications
between Arsenault and such children are also at the sole discretion of the
recipient. Although agreements between biological parents cannot trump
the legal rights of an actual child (and Arsenault posts links directing
readers to the relevant California Family Code provisions,"' which do not
protect him from liability), the agreement's terms clearly establish that
Arsenault sees his role as that of a gamete donor, not a parent.112 However,
Arsenault's commitment to provide information about his life and health, as
well as his openness to establishing contact with children on the recipient's
terms, differentiate him from many other donors accessible through semen
banks.
Other unusual circumstances also distinguish these donations from the
assistance conventionally offered by banks or fertility clinics. First, no
money changes hands. Arsenault is not compensated for his donations in
any way, nor is he reimbursed for any of the many costs associated with the
donations, such as his regular medical tests, purchases of sterile packaging,
or even travel to the drop-off location. Second, no medical intermediary is
involved. Fresh semen can be used for artificial insemination
intracervically by the recipient or her partner with no more than a syringe,
allowing for conception to take place privately and without the presence of
a medical professional. Third, Arsenault offers only his own semen.
Fourth, the contact between donor and recipient is direct. If a woman
seeking donated semen discovers Arsenault's website, she can review the
full slate of information and then contact him directly. Only after an in-
person meeting, a contract signed by both parties, and a meeting of the
minds can a recipient receive Arsenault's semen. Compared with the
common practice of requesting a physician's approval, selecting an
anonymous donor from a brief catalog description, and receiving a drop-
shipped sample of frozen sperm via Federal Express, donations from Trent
Arsenault are significantly more private and personal.
111. Trent Arsenault, California Family Law, http://trentdonor.org/law (last visited June
13, 2012); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (2012).
112. Under California law, legal parentage is determined by examining the intent of the
parties; "the legal parents are those who intended to bring about the birth of the child."
Emily Zapotocny, My Two Moms: California 's Supreme Court Decision in K.M. v. E.G. and
Why Gay Marriage Offers the Best Protection for Same-Sex Families, 21 Wis. WOMEN L.J.
111, 117-18 (2006) (discussing the California Supreme Court's ruling in Johnson v. Calvert,
in which a gestational surrogate was ruled not to be the legal mother of a child produced
using the egg and sperm of a married couple, where the egg-donor wife intended to create
the child, and a California appellate court's ruling in Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, which held that
a then-married couple's intent to create a child using third-party gametes of both types
trumped the divorcing husband's lack of genetic connection to the resulting offspring.
Calvert has since been superseded by statute, as stated in Chatterjee v. King, 2012 NMSC
19, 21 (NMSC 2012)).
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Despite these many dissimilarities, in 2009 the FDA elected to apply 21
C.F.R. Part 1271 to Arsenault's donations. Although it is unclear how the
FDA was alerted to Arsenault's activities, in April of 2009 an investigator
from the FDA's Sacramento office initiated contact with Arsenault.'13
After conversations with the investigator and without the advice of legal
counsel, Arsenault filed a form in November registering himself as a
"directed donor" of HCT/P's, but asserting that his activities were exempt
from the regulatory requirements of 21 C.F.R. Part 1271.114 Shortly
afterwards, FDA agents began a series of four on-site inspections of
Arsenault's "business." (Because the site of manufacture and packaging
was Arsenault's home, this meant that the FDA conducted four separate
inspections of his personal residence.) At the time of the first inspection, on
August 27, 2012, Arsenault attempted to explain to three FDA agents in his
home that he believed that his activities were exempt, but the federal
investigators disagreed. They conducted three additional inspections, on
September 2, 2010; September 9, 2010; and September 16, 2010. At the
September 9th inspection, Arsenault provided to the FDA copies of forty-
one donor agreements, a calendar with the names of recipients and donation
dates, and lists naming individuals who signed donor agreements, even
those who did not later receive a donation.1 15 The FDA also took copies of
Arsenault's health records, including the results of communicable disease
testing.
On September 20, 2010, FDA investigators issued Arsenault with an
inspection observations report describing the various ways in which his
conduct failed to meet 21 C.F.R. Part 1271's regulatory requirements. The
FDA asserted that Arsenault was "not determined to be eligible based on
the results of donor screening and testing."1 1 6 He "did not adequately
screen [himself] for risk factors related to relevant communicable
diseases ... every six months," and the FDA specifically faulted him for
113. E-mail from Shelley H. Beausoleil, Investigator, Sacramento Office, Food and
Drug Administration, to Trent Arsenault (Apr. 29, 2009, 14:57 PST) available at
http://trentdonor.org/sites/g2sites/trentdonor/d/21570-1/FDA-sacramento-request-
registration-email-trentdonor-29-apr-2009.pdf.
114. Interview with Trent Arsenault (Oct. 6, 2011); Trent Arsenault, 2010 FDA Directed
Donor Registration, http://trentdonor.org/v/logos/fda-human-cell-and-tissue
establishment registration/FDA3356_FE13007575901A2009-portrait p2jpg.html (last
visited June 13, 2012).
115. Trent Arsenault, Form FDA 463a Signed Affadavit - 16-Sep-2010,
http://trentdonor.org/sites/g2sites/trentdonor/d/21523-1/FDA-463a-signed-affadavit-16-Sep-
2010-4-Pages.pdf (last visited June 13, 2012).
116. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA Form 483 Inspection-Observation 20-Sep-2010,
http://trentdonor.org/trentdonor/d/21520-2/FDA-Form-483-Inspection-Observations-
TrentDonor-20-Sep-2010-5-Pages.pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2012) [hereinafter FDA
Inspection Form 483].
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failing to adequately screen "for disease risks associated with
xenotransplantation and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease." 1  Despite Arsenault
being tested seven times in less than four years, the FDA asserted that the
"testing of communicable disease agents were not collected at the
appropriate time." 1 When the donations were handed over to recipients,
the "HCT/P's were not accompanied with the summary of the records used
to make the donor-eligibility determination."11 9 The FDA also told
Arsenault that his "firm has not developed written procedures related to
testing, screening, and determining donor eligibility of semen." 12 0
After being informed that his "firm" had failed to comply with 21 C.F.R.
Part 1271's various obligations, Arsenault requested a time extension to
respond. 121 The FDA informed him that he was welcome to respond to the
observations report if he did so within fifteen working days of its issuance,
but that the FDA could proceed with an enforcement action without
considering any responses received after that deadline.122 Arsenault, still
lacking legal counsel, was unable to respond in time.
On November 1, 2010, the FDA's Center for Biologics Evaluation and
Research (CBER) issued an "Order to Cease Manufacture" to Trent
Arsenault:
Your firm, Trent Arsenault (or Establishment), located at 38068
Canyon Heights Drive, Fremont, California, recovers and
distributes semen and therefore is a manufacturer of human cells,
tissues, and cellular and tissue-based products (HCT/Ps). The Food
and Drug Administration (FDA or agency) conducted an
inspection of your Establishment between August 27 and
September 16, 2010, and at the conclusion of the inspection, the
FDA investigator issued you a Form FDA- 483, Inspectional
Observations. Our review of the information and records examined
and collected during the inspection revealed significant violations
of Title 21, Code [of Federal Regulations, Part 1271 (21 C.F.R.
Part 1271) issued under the authority of Section 361 of the Public
Health Service Act (PHS Act) [42 United States Code (U.S.C.)
117. Id. at 2.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 4.
120. Id.
121. Trent Arsenault, Letter from Trent Arsenault to FDA (Oct. 1, 2010), available at
http://trentdonor.org/sites/g2sites/trentdonor/d/21526-1/extension-request-to-FDA-SF-office-
trentdonor-01-oct-2010-1-page.pdf (requesting more time to reply).
122. Trent Arsenault, Letter from FDA to Trent Arsenault (Oct. 7, 2010), available at
http://trentdonor.org/sites/g2sites/trentdonor/d/21529-1/FDA-SF-office-reply-to-extension-
trentdonor-07-oct-2010-1-page.pdf (encouraging a partial response from Mr. Arsenault as
soon as possible).
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264 (2012)]. The agency has determined that because your
Establishment is in violation of 21 CFR Part 1271, your
Establishment does not provide adequate protections against the
risks of communicable disease transmission through the use of
these HCT/P's. This Order to Cease Manufacturing relates to
conduct occurring on or after May 25, 2005, the effective date of
the applicable regulations. FDA retains the authority to pursue
other actions and remedies.
Because of your failure to provide adequate protections against the
risks of communicable disease transmission, pursuant to 21 C.F.R.
Part 1271.440(a)(3), you must cease manufacturing until
compliance with the regulations in 21 C.F.R. Part 1271 has been
achieved and you have been provided written authorization from
FDA to resume operations. Under 21 C.F.R. Part 1271.3(e),
manufacture means, but is not limited to, any or all steps in the
recovery, processing, storage, labeling, packaging, or distribution
of any HCT/P, and the screening or testing of the HCT/P donor.
The Order was to be effective either five working days from its issuance
or after a hearing and determination, if such was requested by Arsenault. 123
Arsenault immediately responded with a letter addressed to FDA Directors
Barbara Cassens and Mary Malarkey, requesting a hearing and describing
his relationships with the recipients.124 Apparently for the first time,
Arsenault informed the FDA in writing that he considered himself exempt
from the 21 C.F.R. Part 1271 directed donor requirements because he fell
within the "sexually intimate partner" exception. On November 11, 2010,
Arsenault confirmed that his November 1, 2010 response had been intended
to invoke the Part 16 hearing process under 21 C.F.R. Part 1271.440(e).125
The next day, the FDA formally acknowledged the request, informing him
that "the Order to Cease Manufacturing will be effective after a decision in,
123. Given that the Order was not effective immediately, there is reason to believe that
CBER did not conclude that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Arsenault's
conduct as a threat to public health. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.440(a)(3) ("When FDA
determines there are reasonable grounds to believe there is a danger to health, such order will
be effective immediately. In other situations, such order will be effective after one of the
following events, whichever is later: (i) Passage of 5 working days from the establishment's
receipt of the orderFalse").
124. Trent Arsenault, Letter from Trent Arsenault to FDA (Nov. 1, 2010), available at
http://trentdonor.org/sites/g2sites/trentdonor/d/21459-4/trentdonor-fda-form-483-response-
doc-01-nov-2010.pdf (replying to the FDA's Cease Manufacturing order, making a hearing
request, and reply to Form 483).
125. Stephany Wesley, Order for Cessation, CBER, (Nov. 12, 2010),
http://trentdonor.org/sites/g2sites/trentdonor/d/21535-1/FDA-CBER-email-effective-date-
cease-order-12-nov-trentdonor-2010.pdf (confirming the Cease Manufacturing order would
be effective after a Part 16 hearing).
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and in accordance with, the Part 16 proceedings."126
Although the Order was not effective due to the pending hearing request,
many potential recipients, including families who had previously had
children with Arsenault's assistance and wanted to conceive genetically
related siblings, were thrown into a state of uncertainty by the FDA's
actions.127 Arsenault kept in communication with the FDA's hearing
coordinator and stated, in accordance with Part 16.24 (g), that he intended
to present and rely upon written information at the hearing: specifically,
"written statements signed by myself and the females who met with me
declaring that we are sexually intimate partners." 128 However, months
passed with no response to his hearing request.
The Part 16 hearing process lacks many of the elements of due process
available in courts-or even in formal administrative proceedings. The
rules of evidence do not apply1 29 and there is no right to counsel. There is
no formal deadline for the agency to respond to a hearing request.
Although the requestor and the government both may file papers in support
or opposition, there are no strictures on the length, timing, or format of such
filings. The request itself is technically before the FDA Commissioner,
Margaret Hamburg, but Hamburg's designee for these purposes is, as of this
writing and at the time of Arsenault's request, Dr. Jesse Goodman, Chief
Scientist and Deputy Commissioner for Science and Public Health of the
FDA. Perhaps ominously, Dr. Goodman was, until only weeks before the
Arsenault investigation began, the Director of CBER-the very entity
whose order Arsenault sought to overturn.130 A Part 16 hearing decision
could encompass only the grant or denial of a hearing, or also include the
substantive legal question of whether the Order was properly issued. A
decision could be made at any time, with or without further information
from the requestor.
Finally, on February 11, 2011, something happened: CBER filed a
motion opposing Arsenault's request. CBER's motion asked that its former
director deny the request for an evidentiary hearing and grant administrative
summary judgment on the question of whether 21 C.F.R. Part 1271 legally
applies to Arsenault's conduct.
The government's chief argument was that no genuine or substantial
126. Id.
127. Trent Arsenault, Order from CBER to Cease Manufacturing of Semen and Hearing
Request http://trentdonor.org/sites/g2sites/trentdonor/d/21508-2/letter-to-FDA-
Commissioner-Hamburg-trentdonor-2010-1128.pdf (Nov. 28, 2010) (pleading for
consideration).
128. Pls.' Mot. Opp. CBER's Mot. Summ. J. 1, Nov. 7, 2011.
129. 21 C.F.R § 16.60 2(c) (2012).
130. Pis.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Opp. CBER's Mot. Summ. J. 2, Nov. 7, 2011.
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issues of fact existed to justify the use of FDA resources conducting a
hearing. Citing the section's preamble, CBER noted that "the primary
purpose of a Part 16 hearing is to resolve factual issues."13 Under §
16.26(a), "the person requesting the hearing" bears the burden of producing
"information ... to show that there exists a genuine and substantial issue of
fact." 53 Fed. Reg. 4,613, 4,614 (Feb. 17, 1988). In this case, Arsenault
has offered to produce, at a hearing, written and oral testimony by himself
and some of the recipients describing their relationship. These statements
would be offered to resolve the factual question of what type of relationship
existed between the donor and recipient-a necessary precondition to
determining whether the sexually intimate partner exception could apply.
CBER argued that Arsenault's new evidence constituted "mere
allegations" 13 2 that "disputed FDA's application of its own regulations,"133
and did not raise a genuine or substantial issue of fact. CBER stressed that
these statements were inconsistent with documentation produced to FDA
inspectors during their investigation: numerous statements by Arsenault,
such as those in donor agreements, his FDA registration form, and his
website, described him as a "directed donor." 13 4 CBER also recapped the
various regulations under 21 C.F.R. Part 1271 with which Arsenault failed
to comply before asking the Commissioner to reject the hearing request,
stating that:
[Arsenault's] explanation, that he is the sexually intimate partner
with those to whom he donates, is nothing more than an attempt to
skirt the law and is offered without a shred of evidence. FDA
cannot accept an expanded definition of the term 'sexually
intimate partner'. To do so, would create a hurdle for the very
individuals Mr. Arsenault claims to be helping. It would create a
hurdle to the protections offered by the donor eligibility
requirements.1 5
CBER's attempt to short-circuit the hearing process and affirm the
issuance of the Order did not produce results. Months passed with no
action from the Commissioner on either Arsenault's request or CBER's
filing. However, the provision permitting Arsenault to donate during the
pendency of the hearing request functioned to increase the stakes, as
Arsenault's decision to continue responding to potential recipients resulted
in even more donations-and pregnancies.
131. 53 Fed. Reg. 4614 (Feb. 17, 1988).
132. CBER's Mem. Supp. Mot. To Deny Hearing Req. & Summ. J. 8, Feb. 7, 2011.
133. Id. at 10.
134. Id. at 9.
135. Id. at 15.
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News coverage of private sperm donation drew widespread attention to
the issue. After his legal troubles were discussed in a Newsweek cover
story, Arsenault obtained pro bono counsel from a nonprofit that focused on
federal regulatory overreach. 136  This enabled him to file a response in
November of 2011 to CBER's motion, arguing that his evidence merited a
hearing, and alternatively that the Order was not lawfully issued. 137 Over a
year later, Dr. Jesse Goodman issued a Commissioner's Decision that
denied Arsenault's hearing request and deemed "the Cease Manufacture
Order properly issued."138 The Order was thus made effective as of
December 7, 2012; Arsenault is barred from donating semen to consenting
women unless he complies with Part 1271's regulations and he receives
written authorization from the FDA.
IV. ISSUES RAISED BY APPLICATION OF 21 C.F.R. PART 1271 TO PRIVATE,
UNCOMPENSATED SEMEN DONATION
By interpreting its regulations to apply to Arsenault, and potentially
others engaging in similar conduct, the FDA has extended its authority in a
new and troubling manner. The regulations themselves do not appear to
apply to private individuals who give semen directly to recipients for
artificial insemination.13 9 Reading them to do so purportedly protects
recipients, but upon examination it may incent riskier, not safer,
conceptions. Barring a man from fathering children with consenting
women by administrative order also raises the question of whether
fundamental rights are being burdened without due process of law. Even if
the FDA had afforded Arsenault more procedural safeguards before issuing
the Order, there remains the substantive question of whether the federal
government has the authority to infringe on the right to procreate in this
manner (which cabins not only Arsenault's procreative liberty, but that of
136. The author, on behalf of her employer organization Cause of Action, represented
Arsenault for the purpose of filing a brief in opposition to CBER's motion. See Pls.' Mot.
Opp. CBER's Mot. Summ. J. 2, Nov. 7, 2011.
137. See Food Additives Permitted for Direct Addition to Food for Human
Consumption; Bacteriophage Preparation, 76 Fed. Reg. 16285 (March 23, 2011) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. § 172), ("In judicial proceedings, a court is authorized to issue
summary judgment without an evidentiary hearing whenever it finds that there are no
genuine issues of material fact in dispute and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law").
138. Trent Arsenault, Comm'r Decision 12-13 (Food & Drug Admin. Dec. 7, 2012)
("Mr. Arsenault therefore appears to assert that he has a Constitutional right to transfer his
sperm to others for artificial insemination without adhering to protections against
communicable disease transmission to the recipients. I disagree that he has a right to violate
the applicable FDA regulations.").
139. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3. C.F.R. § 1271.3 does not include "sexually
intimate partner" in its defined terms.
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women who wish to conceive via Al and a private donor).
A Extending the Textual Boundaries of 21 C.F.R. Part 1271
The FDA's decision to apply existing regulations to private donors like
Arsenault does not naturally follow from their text. Although the
regulations themselves do not explicitly recognize or account for private
donations taking place entirely through negotiations between individuals,
the preamble to the final rule cited by CBER speaks specifically of reducing
the risk posed by artificial insemination in "small medical practice[s] .140
The distinction between conceptions that involve interventions by the
personnel of such practices and those that involve only the biological
parents presents a potential bright-line rule that would carve out space for
Arsenault and other private donors by grouping them with the vast majority
of biological fathers who conceive through intercourse. However, the
FDA's refusal of such a rule highlights the potential scope of a loose
interpretation of 21 C.F.R. Part 1271 and the implications thereof.141
Even if one concedes that 21 C.F.R. Part 1271 applies to Arsenault and
other private donors, the regulations themselves create an exception to
many of the regulatory requirements for donations by sexually intimate
partners (SIPs).142  But neither the Code of Federal Regulations nor the
preamble to the relevant Final Rule define SIPs for purposes of 21 C.F.R.
Part 1271. In its objection to Arsenault's hearing request, CBER asserted
that "the plain meaning of the words ... do not require further
explanation," citing the preamble to the proposed rule to support its
contention that that the "FDA exempted sexually intimate partners because
140. CBER, supra 132, at 9. The cited regulation provides in relevant Part III A: "[T]he
compliance expectations for a small medical practice that provides artificial insemination are
commensurate with the communicable disease risks associated with its activities." 69 Fed.
Reg. 29, 786, 29, 790 (May 25, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 1271).
141. The Supreme Court has held that courts should afford substantial deference to an
agency's interpretation of regulations that it has issued. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462
(1997) (applying Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co, 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) ("[T]he
ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation")). However, this
deferential standard has been criticized by scholars, See, e.g., John F. Manning,
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules,
96 COLUM. L. REv. 612 (1996); Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA-
Sometimes They Just Don't Get It, 10 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 1 (1996). Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), articulates an alternative in stating that respect afforded to an
agency's interpretive position depends upon the thoroughness of its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all other
persuasive factors. Moreover, this deference arises out of the agency's position as the
recipient of delegated statutory authority from Congress, and statutory provisions violative
of the U.S. Constitution are, of course, illegitimate. See Id. at 137-38.
142. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.3(1), .15(e), .90(a)(2), .420.
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insemination with the semen from a sexually intimate partner entails
minimal risks." 14' However, this bluff and condescending statement
ignores the reality that the meaning of those words to officials in
Washington may not reflect the meaning they have to individuals
attempting to start a family through methods that are, if uncommon, still
freighted with intimacy.
Of course, the hazard posed by insemination with a SIP's semen varies
based on the degree to which the attempt to conceive would expose the
recipient to new disease risk. The FDA's logic applies where the
partnership in question is a monogamous couple that regularly engage in
sexual intercourse and do not take part in individual activities that could
lead to asymmetrical exposure. Not only does that describe only a subset of
sexually intimate relationships, but it privileges this subset under a federal
regulatory regime.
By leaving SIP undefined, the FDA perhaps recognized that a federal
agency is not institutionally competent to create one definition of SIP
applicable to more than 300 million Americans. Indeed, it is inevitable that
every individual will define this term for him- or herself. Just as individual
persons ultimately arrive at their own sincerely held religious beliefs,
sincerely held beliefs about sex, intimacy, and relationships will differ
based on subjective experience.
Of course, a less generous interpretation of the government's actions is
supported by CBER's actions in the Arsenault matter. By leaving SIP
undefined, the FDA can avoid a potential controversy, 144 but raise a
legalistic eyebrow whenever an individual steps out of line and tries
something that transgresses against the unwritten, heterosexually-
monogamous definition. For example, in the Arsenault matter, CBER
explicitly claimed that the SIP exemption was created "with the
understanding that such partners would not need to be follow donor
eligibility requirements." 145 To base a regulation on some unspoken and
undefined understanding about sexually intimate partnerships is, at
minimum, problematic.
Moreover, the FDA's "understanding" that SIPs are those between
monogamous, sexually active heterosexual couples does not necessarily
flow from the regulations themselves. A broader understanding is
consistent with the preamble language CBER cited in the Arsenault matter.
143. CBER, supra note 132, at 9-10.
144. Lauren Bruce, What Makes a Woman a Woman?, FEMINISTE, (Apr. 4, 2005)
http://www.feministe.us/blog/archives/2005/04/24/what-makes-a-woman-a-woman/
(discussing the controversy of the proposed Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005,
which defines a woman as solely a female human being capable of becoming pregnant).
145. CBER, supra note 132, at 10 (emphasis added).
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Although that language notes that routine exposure to an SIP's body fluids
is "likely," it does not assume that such exposure is universal, nor does it
make exposure a necessary condition for SIP status. 146
Sexual relationships in modern American society are more diverse than
ever. This poses a challenge to regulatory agencies whose enforcement
actions affect the composition of or rights afforded to these families. In
some instances, as here, the government has a choice between interpreting a
regulation to paternalistically redefine an individual's intimate partnerships
(with the direct effect of making it more difficult for the individual to
exercise his or her reproductive rights), or reading the law in a manner that
respects differences and personal choices about the meaning of intimate
connections. By imposing its particular set of beliefs about the true
meaning of a procreative partnership, the FDA has made a deliberate
decision to apply 21 C.F.R. Part 1271 in a manner that results in serious
harms to individual autonomy.
B. Risk Reduction and 21 C.F.R. Part 1271
The government's decision would be understandable if narrowly defining
the SIP exception actually resulted in a reduction in health risk. However,
the Arsenault case highlighted the irrationality of this interpretation in
practice. CBER asserted that it could order Arsenault to cease donating
semen to consenting adult recipients because he did not follow a plethora of
regulatory standards, which purportedly protect recipients from disease.
However, CBER's ability to stand between a woman and the man she
wished to father her child appeared to hinge completely on the use of a
semen receptacle. If Arsenault (like some other uncompensated donors)
provided natural insemination, CBER's position is apparently that it could
not intervene-even though such activity is riskier than the procedures
followed by Arsenault. 147
146. Suitability Determination for Donors of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based
Products, 64 Fed. Reg. 52, 696, 52, 707 (September 30, 1999) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§
210, 211, 820, 1271) (Preamble to the Proposed Rule). See also Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2010), (quoting In re Marriage Cases, "This contention
[that marriage is limited to opposite-sex couples because only a man and a woman can
produce children biologically related to both] is fundamentally flawed.") (internal citations
omitted); Id. at 956-57, (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, (Scalia, J., dissenting) "What
justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual
couples exercising 'the liberty protected by the Constitution'? Surely not the encouragement
of procreation, since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.") (internal citations
omitted).
147. Although CBER has not asserted that it has the authority to regulate sexual acts
between two previously unacquainted persons if the male partner has offered himself for the
sole purpose of impregnating the female, such a conclusion follows logically from many of
the arguments in its brief. Such an expansion of scope would appear to exceed
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The irrationality of CBER's actions is further illustrated by their
consequences: to avoid disease risk, CBER inadvertently encourages
conduct that poses a greater hazard. If CBER can shut down private,
individual donors providing semen for artificial insemination but cannot
regulate those providing natural insemination, the latter may become the
only free option for women seeking donated semen. CBER's interpretation
of the regulations thus increases the likelihood that a donee lacking funds to
purchase semen from a bank will engage in sexual intercourse with donors,
even if this would mean that she had to engage in an adulterous sexual act
or violate her sexual orientation. Natural insemination carries a greater risk
to both partners: each is exposed to the other's bodily fluids, as well as
potential contagion spread via skin-to-skin contact. To create a regulatory
regime that increases the very type of risk that it seeks to minimize is
irrational on its face.
Issuance of a cease-manufacture order, like any action by an
administrative agency, must be "rational, based on consideration of the
relevant factors, and within the scope of the authority delegated to the
agency by the statute." 148 However, CBER's extension of 21 C.F.R. Part
1271 to donor like Arsenault is irrational and failed to consider important
factors bearing on disease risk, as noted above. Moreover, individuals
seeking to conceive a child together have a protected constitutional interest
in procreative liberty, but this important factor received little or no attention
from CBER in its analysis of 21 C.F.R. Part 1271. The government's brief
described Arsenault as "attempting to circumvent the protections afforded
[non-traditional] 'families,"'14 9 yet ignoring the individual interests of the
recipients and assumed that the government's proper role is to step in and
constitutionally grounded limitations on federal regulatory authority under the Commerce
Clause, U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3, even as interpreted broadly by cases such as Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2005). Under our system of federalism, the federal government's
regulatory authority is not untrammeled but rather is constitutionally limited; purely
intrastate noneconomic activity is outside of the purview of federal regulation. See U. S. v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602, 611 (2000) (characterizing family law, marriage, divorce, and
childrearing as "areas of traditional state regulation" that are outside of the ambit of federal
regulatory authority and outlining constitutional limits on the federal government's
regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause). Moreover, such a broad assertion of
federal power to regulate private procreative choices would bring individual-rights concerns
to the fore with additional urgency. See also infra Part V.
148. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 27, 37
(1983); see also FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 532 (2009).
149. CBER Brief, supra note 132, at 10. Of note is the government's repeated use of
quotation marks around "families" when it refers to the non-traditional partnerships
(predominantly lesbian couples) to which Arsenault donates. The implication is that the FDA
has an "understanding" about what constitutes a family-and a childless same-sex couple
does not qualify.
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protect families from the risk of disease.150
Contrast this with the deference normally granted to persons seeking to
conceive a child with a new or current sexual partner. The courts have
affirmed the importance of individual autonomy in this sphere time and
again and invariably find that the government's ability to interfere in
consensual adults' attempts at conception is extremely limited.15' The
inconsistency with decades of case law accentuates the arbitrary and
capricious nature of CBER's application of 21 C.F.R. Part 1271 to private
semen donation.
V. PROTECTING PROCREATIVE RIGHTS THROUGH PROCESS
Even if 21 C.F.R. Part 1271 was intended to encompass private,
uncompensated semen donation, the Supreme Court's decisions over the
last century have established certain procedural protections that must be
afforded before the government may deprive an individual of a substantive
right. The FDA failed to meet those requirements before issuing a cease-
manufacturing order to Arsenault. 152  Although the order effectively
declared that Arsenault must cease fathering children with consenting adult
150. CBER Brief, supra note 132, at 10.
150. It is unclear whether CBER's references to "families" include children who could
be created through use of ART via a private donor. To the extent that a failure to comply
with 21 C.F.R. 1271's regulatory regime risks harms to presently nonexistent children, it
poses an alternative case of the
"the non-identity problem" famously identified by Derek Parfit. Because the
children in question would not exist unless they were brought into the world, . . .
they are not harmed simply because they have been born into what some have
claimed to be less than optimal circumstances. Indeed, tort law has long
recognized this point in its refusal to grant children damages for "wrongful life"
for being born in disadvantaged or diminished states of well-being when there
was no alternative way for them to have been born. Protecting those children by
denying them existence altogether would thus not provide rational grounds for
denying gays and lesbians the right to marry or to procreate with ARTs.
John A Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 323, 341-42 (2004).
151. See, e.g., Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 538, 541 (1942) (holding that state law
requiring forced sterilization of repeat criminals is unconstitutional because it deprives those
persons of their fundamental right to procreate). But cf. Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617,
623 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that an inmate "has no constitutional right to procreate while in
prison").
152. 21 C.F.R. § 1271. The standard of proof that must be met before a cease-
manufacturing order may issue is considerably lower than even the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard; cf. per 21 C.F.R. § 1271.440(a), (A cease-manufacturer may issue
"[u]pon an agency finding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an HCT/P is a
violative HCT/P because it was manufactured in violation of the regulations in" [this
section]).
30
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 22 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol22/iss1/3
Vol 22, 2013 Annals of Health Law 31
THE CURIOUS CASE OF TRENT ARSENAULT
recipients-a serious infringement of a core liberty 53 -its issuance was the
result of an administrative process lacking in safeguards required to protect
such rights.
Prior to taking an action that deprives an individual of his rights, the
government must conduct a searching inquiry on how such a deprivation
can be accomplished. In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court
described the balancing test that should be used to determine the amount of
process that must be provided before the government may deprive an
individual of their rights:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used... and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.154
The effective consequence of this balancing test is that the amount of
process due is directly proportional to the right being deprived.155  With
respect to the right to reproduce, the Court has determined the right is
fundamental, which requires the utmost procedural due process. 156 While
the Court does not generally provide detailed guidance on procedure, in this
instance it has explicitly held that "[t]he opportunity to present reasons,
either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a
fundamental due process requirement."15
The decision to issue an order to Mr. Arsenault before granting even a
simple hearing to present his evidence clearly falls short of what the
Constitution requires. Arsenault was not afforded a hearing prior to
issuance of the order, and the existing regulatory framework, as the FDA
itself affirmed, permits the agency to decline his request for one if it
determines that no questions of fact remain. ss
The FDA also incorrectly imposed the burden of proof on Arsenault
when he attempted to challenge the cease-manufacturing order. According
to CBER, the burden of proof rested on Arsenault to prove that a genuine
153. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
154. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
155. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
156. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538.
157. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).
158. Motion to Deny Trent Arsenault's Request for a Hearing at 4, Center for Biologics
Evaluation and Research (CBER), (Feb. 7, 2011), available at http://trentdonor.org/
sites/g2sites/trentdonor/d/21703-2/trentdonor-fda-motion-to-deny-hearing-07feb2010.pdf
(last visited Aug. 3, 2012).
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question of fact existed: namely, whether he was a directed donor subject to
21 C.F.R. Part 1271 or an exempt SIP. 159  Arsenault was only able to
present his legal arguments on why the order should not be issued after he
received the order. The Court made it clear in Stanley v. Illinois that in
matters regarding fundamental rights the individual must be provided a
hearing before action is taken, not after.160  The FDA cannot simply
determine that Arsenault, or any donor, is subject to their regulatory regime
and then require him to prove that he is not. The burden of proof is on the
State to prove the matter asserted. 161
The FDA's investigatory procedures and process for issuing cease-
manufacture orders are not legally sufficient where, as in the Arsenault
matter, an individual's fundamental rights are at stake. Although they
might be adequate where a regulated commercial enterprise is the target, a
corporation's right to do business in the health care industry, or even an
individual medical professional's right to practice his or her occupation,
differs in kind from an individual's right to make intimate decisions about
procreation. As discussed below, a long line of cases recognize this right as
fundamental. 162 By failing to provide a hearing prior to issuance of an order
that infringes a fundamental constitutional right and by placing the burden
on Arsenault to prove to the government why he should be allowed to father
additional children, the FDA comprehensively failed in its due process
obligations to Mr. Arsenault.
VI. APPLYING 21 C.F.R. PART 1271 TO THE EXERCISE OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS PROTECTED BY SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTION
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the FDA's targeting of private,
uncompensated semen donation and Trent Arsenault is the implication that
two adults may be prevented from conceiving a child together if the
government disapproves.1 63  CBER's cease-manufacture order and the
related Commissioner's Decision signify that if your sexual relationship
does not fall within certain privileged categories, or if you wish to conceive
without medical intervention but also without sexual intercourse between
159. Id. at 4-5.
160. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
161. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 658.
162. See infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
163. The FDA's decision to interpret its regulations to constrain and potentially
criminalize certain private procreative decisions stands in tension with a long line of
Supreme Court cases striking down state criminal statutes that criminalized both
contraception and conception-related procreative choices. See supra note 151 and
accompanying text.
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the biological parents, the FDA may regulate your reproductive conduct.
American history is pockmarked with a shameful series of attempts by
government to regulate reproductive freedom and to legally bar certain
individuals from reproducing how and with whom they choose-or at all. 164
The U.S. Supreme Court has held, however, that federal and state
governments must respect procreative liberty under the doctrine of
substantive due process. Private and uncompensated provision of semen to
a consenting individual recipient for the purpose of conceiving a child
implicates these fundamental constitutional rights. By asserting the right to
regulate Arsenault, the FDA flew in the face of decades of precedent.
The decision to attempt to conceive a child falls within the constitutional
right to make individual decisions about procreation free from unwarranted
government intrusion. This right has been repeatedly recognized as a
fundamental one arising out of an individual's right to privacy. The first
case doing so, Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, struck down a state law
permitting the sterilization of habitual criminals. The Skinner Court
described procreation as a basic liberty that is fundamental to our
existence and recognized that the statute deprived certain
individuals of a right which is basic to the perpetuation of a race -
the right to have offspring. Although the Court arrived at its
holding through an equal protection analysis, Skinner is generally
identified as the seminal case for establishing the right to
procreate.16 5
Moreover, nearly forty years ago, the Court further elaborated on the
right to procreate in the context of a law barring unmarried persons from
possessing contraception, holding that "[i]f the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
164. E.g., Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding an Alabama ruling
upholding the state's anti-miscegenation law that prevented the "evil tendency of
[fornication]" from being made greater by the "amalgamation of the two races, producing a
mongrel population and a degraded civilization. . ." Pace & Cox v. State, 69 Ala 231, 233
(1882)); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (concluding that society can and must
prevent the "feeble-minded" from reproducing through sterilization, effectively endorsing
state-sponsored negative eugenics), but see Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("The
power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil
or reckless hands it can cause races or types, which are inimical to the dominant group to
wither and disappear. There is no redemption for the individual whom the law touches.").
165. Allison Lampert, Note: An Andy Warhol Society- First Coca-Cola, Now Humans:
An Examination of Whether a Ban on Human Cloning Violates Procreative Liberty, 16 ST.
JOHN'S J.LEGAL COMM. 245, 253-54 (Winter 2002). See also Sarah L. Dunn, Note: The
"ART" of Procreation: Why Assisted Reproduction Technology Allows for the Preservation
of Female Prisoners' Right to Procreate, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 2561, 2565-67 (2002).
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a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."166
The courts have, if anything, continued to respect and, indeed, broaden
privacy rights' umbrella of protection over procreative liberty. The well-
known case of Roe v. Wade established that the right of privacy included
the right of a woman to choose whether to have an abortion prior to fetal
viability.167 In another contraception case, Carey v. Population Services
International,16 8 the Court stated that "access to contraceptives is essential
to exercise of the constitutionally protected right of deciding matters of
childbearing that is the underlying foundation of the holdings in Griswold,
Eisenstadt, and Roe."1 69 Even as the scope of abortion rights was qualified
by subsequent cases, the Court was careful to note that "subsequent
constitutional developments have neither disturbed, nor do they threaten to
diminish, the scope of recognized protection accorded to the liberty relating
to intimate relationships, the family, and decisions about whether or not to
beget or bear a child."1 70
Substantive due process, via the rights to privacy and individual
autonomy, extends to protect those important decisions even when they
involve traditionally non-procreative relationships or nontraditional
procreative acts. 1  As one scholar noted during the early days of ART,
A court interpreting the procreative rights of married persons as
extending to noncoital or collaborative reproduction cannot
reasonably be accused of reading its own values into the due
process clause; it is merely recognizing the logical extension of a
166. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (protecting the right of unmarried
persons to possess contraceptives). Of course, CBER's position is that governmental
intrusion is warranted where the biological father seeks only to donate his gametes for the
purpose of facilitating the reproductive aspirations of a couple incapable of conceiving
otherwise, and where those gametes are not conveyed via natural insemination.
167. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
168. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
169. Lampert, supra note 165, at 256 (citing Carey, 431 U.S. at 685). See also Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (citing Carey, 431 U.S.
at 685) ("Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.").
170. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992).
171. See John Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J. L. AND
MED. 439, 446-50 (2003). ("[T]here may be intense debate about whether something is
central or material to reproduction and thus properly regarded as part of, or an aspect of,
procreative liberty, just as there is sharp debate about the seriousness and risk of resulting
harms.. .. All such arguments, it seems, relate to how essential or material those activities
are to the values that underlay the importance to individuals of their decision to avoid or
engage in reproduction. While people may disagree over the precise limits, the argument, if
properly focused, should be about the closeness of the activity in question to the values that
support freedom in reproductive decision-making and whether the effects on others of
exercising that freedom justify limiting it.") Id. at 449.
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right already firmly established. If the sin of basing a right on
substantive due process is being committed, the sinners are the
justices who have, over several decades, established the principles
that form the basis of the right of a married couple to conceive,
bear, and rear children. 172
The appropriate degree of scrutiny for regulations impairing the exercise
of this right has generally been described as strict scrutiny: the government
must demonstrate that the regulation will advance a compelling interest and
there is no less restrictive alternative.1 73
These vital interests were even recognized by CBER in its opposition to
Arsenault's hearing request, if only obliquely. In discussing the preamble
to the proposed rule, CBER cited the FDA's explicit deference to the
attending physician, donor, and recipient in the context of determining the
scope of appropriate screening and testing for SIP donations-a decision
that respects the autonomy of the potential parents and their assessment of
risk.174 Although CBER asserted that the basis for this decision was the
FDA's belief that "insemination with the semen from a sexually intimate
partner entails minimal risks,"1 7 it is perhaps more literally true that the
preamble recognizes simply that the parties to a sexually intimate
partnership are in the best position to know if insemination entails minimal
risks or not. The donor and recipient base this upon their first-hand
knowledge of each other's medical1 76 and sexual histories, as well as of
172. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy,
and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 429 (1982) (footnote omitted). But see Gail H. Javitt,
Annotated Bibliography, SYMPOSIUM: "AT THE CROSSROADS-PUBLIC/PRIVATE
PRIORITIES CONCERNING ACCESS TO GENETIC INFORMATION": ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY Reproductive Genetics 1991-2002: A Selected Annotated Legal
Bibliography of Genetic Testing, Gene Transfer and Reproductive Cloning, 6 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL'Y 317, 352 (2003) (discussing Clarke D. Forsythe, Human Cloning and the
Constitution, 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 469 (1998), which argues that
substantive due process decisions relating to family law and reproduction do not
encompass using technology for asexual reproduction, and in particular, for
cloning. These cases recognize limited privacy interests in marital coital
reproduction, in protecting traditional family relationships and protecting
"negative" liberties such as the right to refuse medical treatment. These cases
recognize rights that are "deeply rooted in the common law." Furthermore, the
reproduction-related cases are premised on coital reproduction, and cannot be
extended to extracorporeal reproduction.... The author construes Roe v. Wade
as protecting only a "negative" right to terminate pregnancy free of governmental
intrusion, and not a broader "positive" reproductive liberty.
173. Robertson, supra note 172, at 433.
174. CBER, supra note 132, at 9 (citing Suitability Determination for Donors of Human
Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 64 Fed. Reg. 52696 (September 30, 1999). See also
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
175. CBER, supra note 132, at 9.
176. Of course, HIPAA regulations such as 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.532, 160.103, and other
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their partner's likelihood of engaging in activities that risk disease
exposure.1  Where the partners are personally acquainted, as are the vast
majority of the biological parents of children conceived in the U.S., these
assessments are typically performed without government second-guessing.
Absent any personal knowledge or communication between a donor and
recipient, as with anonymous donors to semen banks, screening seems wise
and necessary. However, Arsenault and many other private donors
differentiate themselves from the anonymous status quo by providing
interpersonal connection: in-person meetings, email correspondence, and
commitments to continued contact and disclosure.
Another crucial difference between private semen donors and the typical
fertility clinic or semen bank regulated by the FDA is the absence of a
medical intermediary. As previously noted, where the donor and recipient
are not intimately acquainted, it may be helpful to have a third-party
conduct screening and testing for disease. But when two individuals enter
into a relationship they believe to be sexually intimate and plan to conceive
a child without the participation of a medical professional, the government
does not typically intervene.
This is because the government's interest in regulating gamete donation
is part and parcel of its broader interest in ensuring that medical practices
conduct themselves safely and in accordance with professional norms. This
is implicit in the various regulations in 21 C.F.R. Part 1271. The
regulations are targeted at "establishments": "place[s] of business under
one management, at one general physical location, that engage [. . .] in the
manufacture of human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-based
products."1  Customers of a semen bank, fertility clinic, or small medical
practice rely upon a matrix of state and federal regulations to ensure that the
opaque and complex services they purchase are provided safely. Such
regulation of commerce and of licensed professionals is common in the
health care field as well as in many other elements of the economy.179
Pecuniary incentives pervade provision of commercially provided health
care services; the many and costly requirements of 21 C.F.R. Part 1271
laws protecting individual privacy in medical records mean that many couples have only
indirect knowledge of their partner's STI test results and must take the partner's
representation on faith, just as is the case with Arsenault's recipients, who have access to
online summaries of test results but not original records or third-party testing.
177. Screening might be appropriate in monogamous heterosexual sexual relationships
if, for example, one or both partners were exposed to infectious disease through a job in a
hospital or prison, or via intravenous drug use. An open or non-dyadic relationship would
also pose a more complex challenge and potentially merit screening.
178. 21 C.F.R 1271.3 (b) (2012) (emphasis added).
179. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) ("[t]he power
to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulated.").
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attempt to ensure that establishments offering fertility assistance do not cut
costs in a manner that increases disease risk for their customers.
But how are regulations aimed at businesses' bottom lines relevant to
uncompensated private individuals? And what use are the standards of care
applicable to regulated medical professions if the only parties to a
conception are the donor and recipient? A private semen donor may have
an interest in minimizing his outlay on health screening and testing-but so
does any individual looking for sexual partners. As previously noted,
women are accustomed to assessing the veracity of their partners'
statements about disease risk and defining the scope of sexual activity
accordingly. They may elect to require less screening than a medical
professional would apply to an anonymous human tissue donation, but
those standards prevent doctors from imposing risk on patients; in a
donor/recipient partnership without medical involvement, the risk is
assessed by and taken on by the partners themselves.
The absence of a representative of the medical establishment in private
semen donation activities highlights their similarity to the countless
conception attempts over which the FDA has not asserted regulatory
authority. Private donation, in these circumstances, resembles the millions
upon millions of independent judgments by partners attempting to conceive
a child through simple acts of intercourse; and personal decisions to
conceive via private sperm donation should be afforded the same degree of
freedom from government interference as those judgments. As the Court
has recognized, decisions about accomplishing conception are "among the
most private and sensitive." 8 o The protected, personal, and intimate nature
of this choice is not eliminated if the recipient or her partner makes use of a
cup and syringe to maximize the chance of pregnancy.
VII. GOVERNMENT OR INDIVIDUALS: WHO DEFINES SEXUAL INTIMACY?
The nature of the intimate partnership between individual private semen
donors and recipients itself raises questions. The FDA's attempt to apply
21 C.F.R. Part 1271 to Arsenault could founder on the government's failure
to define the exception under which Arsenault seeks shelter. If a private
semen donor and a recipient with whom he agrees to conceive children have
created a sexually intimate partnership, the cease-manufacture order to
Arsenault would be void, as none of the various infractions for which he
was cited would apply to an SIP."' This term, undefined in the regulations
or statute, is the fulcrum on which the future of unregulated private semen
donation may rest.
180. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
181. See supra note 142.
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Despite CBER's bald assertion that its interpretation of SIP (which
excludes Arsenault and his recipient partners) "is in sync with the plain
meaning of the words, which do not require further explanation," 18 2 it is far
from clear that the meaning of sexually intimate partnership is-or can
be-delimited by a government agency. The right to intimate association is
implicated where the government seeks to define a procreative relationship
out of existence and impose burdensome regulations upon individuals who
fall outside the norm. 183
The Supreme Court has recognized that the partnership between two
persons creating a child "by definition concerns the most intimate of human
activities and relationships."184 Furthermore, sexually intimate relationships
can involve a broad range of physical and emotional intimacies, only some
of which are contained within the SIP definition advanced by the FDA. On
one end of the spectrum are partners who procreate together, sharing a
romantic connection and a variety of bodily fluids. Genuine sexual
intimacy is a fundamentally subjective experience, and in other contexts
could be present even when a couple engaged in sexually gratifying conduct
that involved no physical contact.185 Moreover, the regulations' definition
of a sexually intimate partnership does not require touching.1 86 As noted
above, the explanatory language CBER itself cited as bearing on the
definition of SIP does not presume that an SIP will always have had
previous exposure to his or her partner's body fluids.18 7 And the
182. CBER, supra note 132, at 10.
183. Challenges to the extension of constitutional jurisprudence to protect certain
intimate choices must account for changing social mores and the government's interest in
protecting discrete and insular minorities from majoritarian tyranny and oppression. But see
David M. Smolin, Fourteenth Amendment Unenumerated Rights Jurisprudence: An Essay in
Response to Stenberg v. Carhart, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 815, 838 (2001) (attributing
the constitutional instability of substantive due process as arising from "an amoral
jurisprudence of unenumerated rights disconnected from the historical narrative of
emancipation," with particular instability present where the courts "embrac[e] as a
fundamental right an act regarded as ethically aberrant by the broader society.")
184. Id.
185. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 956-57 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(quoting In re Marriage Cases, "This contention [that marriage is limited to opposite-sex
couples because only a man and a woman can produce children biologically related to both]
is fundamentally flawed.") (internal citations omitted); id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas,
(Scalia, J., dissenting) "What justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of
marriage to homosexual couples exercising 'the liberty protected by the Constitution'?
Surely not the encouragement of procreation, since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to
marry.") (internal citations omitted).
186. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of.")
187. Suitability Determination for Donors of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based
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relationship between private, non-anonymous semen donors and their
recipients is an intimate exchange and an expression of personal trust
different from, but no less important than, an act of sexual intercourse.
For people whose concept of intimacy differs from the "plain meaning"
the FDA might grasp (and perhaps from the majority of Americans), the
prospect that the federal government could define their relationship out of
existence is a real and ongoing threat."' Supreme Court precedent supports
the rights of donors and recipients to self-define. Lawrence reflected a
significant commitment by the Supreme Court to the protection of
individually defined and chosen intimate relationships.189 Sexual contact is,
per Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court, "but one element in a personal
bond."190 And the Court has repeatedly recognized the importance of
allowing individuals to make judgments about their sexual and procreative
relations without unnecessary governmental interference. 191 Most recently,
the Court noted that the "general rule should counsel against attempts by
the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its
boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law
,,192
protects. Although the FDA claims an interest in preventing disease,
permitting a federal agency to ban medically unassisted, non-commercial
reproductive activity has serious implications for individual liberty.
VIII. CUPS, SYRINGES, AND SLIPPERY SLOPES
By rejecting Arsenault's characterization of his connections with the
recipients, CBER implicitly affirmed its own supremacy in the area of
defining personal relationships and its ability to intervene in non-standard
procreative arrangements where a new risk of disease is present. Both of
Products, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,696, 52,707 (September 30, 1999) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§
210, 211, 820, 1271) (Preamble to the Proposed Rule).
188. Cf. Ellen Waldman & Marybeth Herald, Eyes Wide Shut: Erasing Women's
Experiences from the Clinic to the Courtroom, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 285 (2005)
(discussing the dangers of limiting substantive due process rights of intimacy and privacy
rights to historical, androcentric, or consanguineous definitions).
189. Katheryn D. Katz, Lawrence v. Texas: A Case for Cautious Optimism Regarding
Procreative Liberty, 25 WOMEN's RIGHTs L. REP. 249, 252 (Fall 2004) (comparing the trend
in pre-Lawrence cases extending substantive due process protection "to only the most
traditional family arrangements" with Lawrence's recognition of the dignity of same-sex
relationships). Katz further notes that the majority opinion in Lawrence "gives reason to
hope and a basis to argue that reproductive choices using ARTS are also entitled to
recognition and protection." Id. at 253.
190. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
191. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life.")
192. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
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these principles unconstitutionally infringe on the rights of Arsenault, the
recipients, and potentially other citizens.
By construing its regulations to cover interactions between private
individuals, where no medical personnel are involved and no medical
procedure is performed, CBER has dramatically widened the scope of its
supposed mandate to protect. It asserted that it had the right to stop
Arsenault from providing semen to consenting adult recipients because
doing so "protects [families] from communicable diseases."1 93 However,
the preamble to the final rule cited by CBER speaks specifically to reducing
the risk posed by artificial insemination in "small medical practice[s]." 194 If
CBER's purview is not limited to the regulation of medical practices or
professionals, and instead includes the ability to regulate reproductive
decisions made by two private individuals in a non-commercial context, the
consequences for individual autonomy and privacy are dire.
To put it plainly, if CBER's regulatory sphere encompasses private,
uncompensated donations of semen in receptacles due to the disease risk
posed by transmission of body fluids from a new partner, then its basis for
regulation could easily and logically extend to cover exchanges of body
fluids in which no receptacle is involved and instead insemination is
accomplished via physical contact between the donor and recipient: i.e.,
sexual intercourse. 195 This would bring Arsenault as well as donors who
give via natural insemination within CBER's purview-along with millions
of other sexually active persons. Surely CBER would not agree that it
could regulate such conduct-but the arguments fielded in support of the
order lead to just that conclusion. Even if private donors were subject to
regulation, unlike other biological fathers, due to their stated intent, CBER
would be forced to investigate the subjective intentions of male sexual
partners-an intrusive emotional inquiry.1 96
193. CBER, supra note 132, at 10
194. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
195. Any such extension of regulatory authority over uncompensated private sexual or
procreational activities would be unconstitutional even under Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005) (the Commerce Clause does not extend to regulation of noneconomic activity unless
it has a substantial impact on interstate commerce). Cf. Anne Lawton, The Frankenstein
Controversy: The Constitutionality of a Federal Ban on Cloning, 87 Ky. L.J. 277 (1998-99)
(arguing that the Commerce Clause does not preclude a federal ban on cloning because it
may be used in conjunction with in vitro fertilization, a significant business enterprise;
research facilities conducting cloning employ scientists, who share information interstate;
and patients will probably cross state lines to access cloning, just as they do for existing
ART services).
196. The law, recognizing the burdensome nature of such investigations, has arrived at
several solutions for determining paternity absent knowledge of the biological father's intent.
A general description of these can be found in Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood By Pure
Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS
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Moreover, CBER's interpretation of the regulations requires it (as was
the case with Arsenault) to send investigators into the sites of manufacture
of private semen donation, even when that means inspecting an individual's
bedroom. 197 The outrageous nature of such actions was cited by the
Supreme Court for rhetorical effect in Griswold v. Connecticut, in which
the majority noted that "the very idea" of "allow[ing] the police to search
the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives ... is repulsive to the notions of privacy." 198 Just as the
Supreme Court feared, FDA agents went marching into Mr. Arsenault's
bedroom-but this time on the hunt for telltale signs of unauthorized
attempts to conceive.
CBER claimed that its intervention is justified because of safety
concerns. However, ironically, by expanding its scope of regulatory
authority, CBER may decrease both reproductive autonomy and safety. As
noted above, CBER has created a loophole in regulatory enforcement for
donors who have unprotected sexual intercourse with recipients-even if
their intentions are identical to Arsenault's. In the final analysis, CBER's
overbroad interpretation cannot stand "in light of the familiar principle, so
often applied by the Court, that a 'governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms.'
199
L.J. 597, 623-24 (March 2002).
Under all statutes that define the paternity ramifications of artificial insemination
by donor, the husband of an artificially inseminated woman is the father of the
resulting child if he consented to the insemination. . . . The typical method of
demonstrating consent is through a signed writing, but consent can also be
established orally. Where a husband gives no written or oral consent, even in
states with no governing statute, he may nonetheless be liable for support under
contract theories or equitable principles.
Storrow is careful to note that the law sometimes applies different presumptions to
anonymous versus known sperm donors, however, and that a presumption of legal parental
status for husbands can function to discriminate against single women and lesbian couples.
See id. at 628 (citing Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to
Assisted Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL
J. HEALTH CARE L. 147, 150-51 (2000)).
197. See DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
INSPECTIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TRENT ARSENAULT, (2010), available at http://
trentdonor.org/trentdonor/d/21520-2/FDA-Form-483-Inspection-Observations-TrentDonor-
20-Sep-2010-5-Pages.pdf.
198. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
199. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307
(1964)).
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IX. CONCLUSION
Although the number of individuals directly affected by the FDA's
cease-manufacture order to Trent Arsenault was relatively small, that
exercise of new authority by the agency justifies careful examination. First,
is it consistent with the cited regulations and the enabling statute? Second,
is it a legitimate exercise of government authority as limited by recent
constitutional jurisprudence? Third, is regulation of private, noncommercial
use of artificial insemination wise public policy?
The prevailing norms in the reproductive medicine industry, along with
existing application of federal and state regulations, create a safe and widely
acceptable option for many couples struggling with infertility. However,
individuals who are underserved by the medical profession's attempts to
industrialize conception have sought new alternatives that provide different
and distinctive benefits, such as specific knowledge about the donor's past
and future actions and well being. These private arrangements, carefully
tailored to respect the needs and desires of individual couples, have come
under attack by the federal government, under the guise of promoting
safety. Doing so required the FDA to blur the boundaries between
commercial and non-commercial conduct in a manner that raises
constitutional questions and erodes individual privacy. It rested on an
artificial and unstable distinction between semen donations via natural
versus artificial insemination and it functions to prevent loving couples
from conceiving much-desired children in the manner and with the partner
of their choice. Although the courts have often heard cases on reproductive
rights dealing with the rights to contraception or abortion, they may soon be
posed before a funhouse mirror of substantive due process rarely confronted
since the days when "[t]hree generations of imbeciles [were] enough": 20 0
Under what circumstances can the government tell you not to conceive with
another person?
200. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (concluding that society can and must
prevent the "feeble-minded" from reproducing through sterilization, effectively endorsing
state-sponsored negative eugenics).
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